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Abstract
Beginning with the Bell theorem, cyclic systems of dichotomous ran-
dom variables have been the object of many foundational findings in quan-
tum mechanics. Here, we ask the question: if one chooses a cyclic system
“at random” (uniformly within the hyperbox of all possible systems with
given marginals), what are the odds that it will be contextual? We show
that the odds of contextuality rapidly tend to zero as the size of the sys-
tem increases. The result is based on the Contextuality-by-Default theory,
in which we do not have to assume that the systems are subject to the
no-disturbance/no-signaling constraints.
1 Introduction
Cyclic systems of dichotomous random variables have played a prominent role in
contextuality research. Suffice it to say that they are the object of the celebrated
Bell theorem [1–4], as well as the Leggett-Garg theorem [5–8], Klyachko-Can-
Binicioğlu-Shumovsky theorem [9–11], and many other results. In this paper
we present a simple proof of the following proposition: the epistemic (Bayesian)
probability that a randomly chosen cyclic system of dichotomous random vari-
ables is contextual tends to zero as its rank n increases. The terms in this
statement are to be rigorously defined later, but the gist is as follows. Systems
of random variables representing measurements or hypothetical physical events
can be classified into contextual and noncontextual. If a system is of a special
kind, called cyclic, it is represented by a point within an n-dimensional hyper-
box B whose edges are determined by the individual (marginal) distributions
of the random variables the system contains. We consider these distributions
fixed, and different meanings of a “randomly chosen” cyclic system correspond
to different distributions of points within the hyperbox B. Here, we assume this
distribution to be uniform. A part of the hyperbox B forms a noncontextuality
polytope K consisting of all points representing noncontextual cyclic systems.
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The epistemic probability of choosing a contextual system is then
ǫ = 1−
vol (K)
vol (B)
, (1)
where vol stands for Euclidean hypervolume. Termed differently, ǫ is the Bayesian
probability of contextuality, with uniform prior. The precise value of ǫ depends
on the marginal distributions that define the hyperbox B, but we show that
ǫ ≤ 2n−1/n!, which tends to zero as n increases. The paper draws on the recent
detailed analysis of cyclic systems given in [12].
2 Definitions
Our analysis is based on the Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) theory [11,13–15].
A cyclic system of rank n = 2, 3, . . ., is a system
Rn =
{{
Rii, R
i
i⊕1
}
: i = 1, . . . , n
}
, (2)
where ⊕1 is the cyclic shift 1 7→ 2, . . . , n − 1 7→ n, n 7→ 1, and
{
Rii, R
i
i⊕1
}
are pairs of jointly distributed random variables. We will assume here that all
Rij are dichotomous, 0/1-variables (although any other labeling will be equally
acceptable). The matrix below presents an example of a cyclic system:
R11 R
1
2 c = 1
R22 R
2
3 c = 2
R33 R
3
4 c = 3
R41 R
4
4 c = 4
q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4 R4
(3)
This is a cyclic system of rank 4, describing, e.g., the object of the best known
version of the Bell theorem [2, 3]. The columns of the matrix correspond to
properties q being measured, denoted by the subscripts of the variables. Thus,
in the target application of the Bell theorem, q = 1 and q = 3 represent Alice’s
settings, while q = 2 and q = 4 represent Bob’s settings. We generically refer
to q = j in Rij as the content of this random variable. The rows of the matrix
correspond to contexts in which the random variables are pairwise recorded,
denoted by their superscripts. So, a random variable in a system is uniquely
identified by its content and its context.
If any two content-sharing (i.e., equally subscripted, measuring the same
property) random variables are identically distributed, i.e., if
〈
Rij
〉
=
〈
Ri
′
j
〉
for any i, i′, j for which Rij and R
i′
j exist, the system is said to be consistently
connected. This is the CbD term for compliance with the no-disturbance/no-
signaling constraint. Unlike most approaches to contextuality (an exception
being [16]), CbD does not need this assumption, so the cyclic systems here are
generally inconsistently connected.
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The definition of (non)contextuality is based on the notion of a coupling. In
system (2), any two context-sharing random variables are jointly distributed,
but any two random variables belonging to different contexts are stochastically
unrelated. The system Rn as a whole therefore is not jointly distributed. A
coupling of Rn is a set of jointly distributed random variables (hence, a random
variable in its own right)
S =
{
Sij : j = i, i⊕ 1; i = 1, . . . , n
}
(4)
such that 

〈
Sii
〉
=
〈
Rii
〉
= pii〈
Sii⊕1
〉
=
〈
Rii⊕1
〉
= pii⊕1〈
SiiS
i
i⊕1
〉
=
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉
= pi,i⊕1

 , i = 1, . . . , n. (5)
The system Rn is noncontextual if it has a coupling S in which any two content-
sharing random variables coincide with maximal possible probability. It is easily
seen that this means〈
SiiS
i⊖1
i
〉
= min
(
pii, p
i⊖1
i
)
= pi,i⊖1, i = 1, . . . , n, (6)
where ⊖1 is the inverse of ⊕1. If such a coupling does not exist, the system is
contextual. The intuition is that the contexts in this case “force” the content-
sharing variables to be more dissimilar than they can be if taken in isolation.
In the particular case of consistently connected systems, min
(
pii, p
i⊖1
i
)
= 1, and
one can say, with a slight abuse of language, that in contextual systems the con-
texts prevent the content-sharing random variables from being “the same.” This
is, essentially, the traditional understanding of contextuality [15,17]. There is a
simple closed-form criterion of (non)contextuality proved in [18] (and reduced
to one proved in [19] in the special case of consistently connected systems). In
this paper, however, we make no use of this criterion.
3 Main Result
To define epistemic probabilities, one needs a principled way of placing a system
within a space of systems. Here, we follow the scheme we used in [12] to define
a noncontextuality polytope and measures of (non)contextuality. Due to the
prominent role of [12] in our reasoning, we explain notation correspondences
with that paper in several subsequent footnotes. We begin by introducing three
probability vectors.1 With reference to (5), denote
a =
(
1, p1
1
, p1
2
, p2
2
, p2
3
, . . . , pnn, p
n
1
)⊺
, (7)
and
b = (p12, p23, . . . , pn−1,n, pn1)
⊺ . (8)
With reference to (6), denote
c =
(
p1n, p21, . . . , pn−1,n−2, pn,n−1
)⊺
. (9)
1The probability vectors a,b, c below correspond, respectively, to pl,pb,pc in [12].
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A system represented by (a,b, c)⊺ is noncontextual if and only if there is a
vector h ≥ 0 (componentwise) such that
Mh = (a,b, c)⊺, (10)
where M is an incidence (0/1) matrix whose detailed description is given in
[12–14]. For any set of fixed 1-marginals (which means fixed vectors a and c),
we call the convex polytope
K = {b| ∃h ≥ 0 : Mh = (a,b, c)
⊺
} (11)
the noncontextuality polytope. We remark in passing that the L1-distance be-
tween a point b and the surface of the polytope K is a natural measure of
contextuality (if b is outside K) or noncontextuality (if b is in K) of the system
represented by b [12, 14].
It is easily seen that
max
(
0, pii + p
i
i⊕1 − 1
)
≤ pi,i⊕1 ≤ min
(
pii, p
i
i⊕1
)
, i = 1, . . . , n, (12)
whence K is inscribed in the hyperbox
B =
n∏
i=1
[
max
(
0, pii + p
i
i⊕1 − 1
)
,min
(
pii, p
i
i⊕1
)]
. (13)
Let us agree to call the vertices of B odd or even depending on whether its
coordinates contain, respectively, an odd or even number of left endpoints of
the intervals in (13). We need the following two results from [12].
Lemma 1 (Lemma 13 in [12]). Every even vertex of B belongs to K (i.e.,
represents a noncontextual system).2
Lemma 2 (Lemma 10 in [12]). If all 1-marginal probabilities are 1/2 (uniform
distributions), then K is the n-demicube whose vertices are even vertices of B.3
We are ready now to make our main observation. We define the epistemic
probability of a system falling within a Lebesque-measurable subset S of B as the
ratio of their Lebesque measures (in our case, Euclidean volumes of polytopes).
Theorem 3. For any cyclic system of rank n,
ǫ = 1−
volK
volB
≤
2n−1
n!
. (14)
This upper bound is tight.
2In [12], where we also consider other polytopes, the noncontextuality polytope K is denoted
by Pb or, if the values of the random variables are encoded as −1/ + 1 rather than 0/1, by
Eb. The hyperbox B, with the −1/+ 1 encoding of values, is denoted by Rb.
3In reference to (13), B in this case is hypercube [0, 1/2]n. In [12], it corresponds to
hypercube [−1, 1]n denoted by Cb.
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Proof. By Lemma 1, since K is convex, it contains the polytope D formed by the
even vertices of B. This polytope is an n-demibox.4 Within B, it is separated
from any odd vertex of B by the corner formed by this vertex and the endpoints
of the sides of B emanating from this vertex. The volume of this corner is
L1 . . . Ln/n!, where Li is the length of the ith side in (13). There are 2n−1 such
corners, whence
volD = volB− 2n−1
L1 . . . Ln
n!
. (*)
Since volB = L1 . . . Ln, the epistemic probability for a point randomly chosen
within B to fall within D is
volD
volB
= 1−
2n−1
n!
. (**)
The upper bound stated in the theorem now follows from volK ≥ volD. By
Lemma 2, in the case of uniform 1-marginals K coincides with D. This proves
that the upper bound is tight.
Although we fixed the 1-marginals in the proof, we see that the epistemic
probability is bounded by an expression that only depends on n. The conver-
gence of this upper bound to zero is quite fast:
n 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 50 . . .
ǫ ≤ 1 6.67 3.34 1.34 1.42 1.26 2.16 1.86
×10−1 ×10−1 ×10−1 ×10−4 ×10−8 ×10−13 ×10−50 . . .
(15)
Depending on the 1-marginals, ǫ can be much smaller than 2n−1/n!.
One could also consider the epistemic probability ǫ˜ of choosing a contextual
system in the 3n-dimensional space formed by all vectors
p˜ =
(〈
Rii
〉
,
〈
RiiR
i
i⊕1
〉
,
〈
Rii⊕1
〉
: i = 1, . . . , n
)
. (16)
Because the upper bound for ǫ in Theorem 3 does not depend on 1-marginals,
this upper bound also bounds ǫ˜, irrespective of the epistemic distribution of
choices of the 1-marginals (provided the conditional probability of contextuality,
given the 1-marginals, is defined as above).
4 Conclusion
Our finding is surprising, as it shows that complexity and contextuality may very
well be antagonists. Whether this has deeper interpretational consequences de-
pends on how much it can be generalized beyond the class of cyclic systems.
One problem is that size of a system is not a well-defined concept outside spe-
cially defined classes of systems. For cyclic systems, their rank n determines
simultaneously the number of contexts (n), the number of contents (n), and the
4We use this term as a straightforward generalization of n-demicube.
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number of random variables (2n). Generally, however, the number of contents
and contexts can be incremented independently, and it is easy to see that our
result will not always hold. Consider, e.g., a system with two contents and
increasing number n of contexts. It can be shown that the epistemic proba-
bility with which such a system is contextual generally does not decrease with
increasing n (e.g., within the class of consistently connected systems this epis-
temic probability is 1 for all n ≥ 2). Even if we define the size of a system as
the rank of its largest cyclic subsystem, our result still will not be generalized
automatically: as shown in [12], a system whose cyclic subsystems are all non-
contextual may very well be contextual (although the epistemic probability of
this has not been investigated). Further work is needed.
What can be said about cyclic systems of random variables that are not
dichotomous? CbD requires that each random variables in an initial system
be replaced with a set of jointly distributed dichotomizations thereof, and only
then subjected to contextuality analysis [13]. However, a cyclic system thus
dichotomized is no longer cyclic. In the case of categorical random variables
with unordered sets of values, we form all possible dichotomizations, and then
we have a simple necessary condition for noncontextuality, given by the nominal
dominance theorem [13]. Using this condition, our computations show that
for cyclic systems the epistemic probability of contextuality increases with the
number of unordered values of the random variables. This, however, is not
an easily interpretable result, because as the set of possible values of random
variables increases in cardinality, it is progressively less feasible to treat it as
completely unordered, and it becomes impossible when the cardinality is infinite.
For ordered/structured sets of values the idea of all possible dichotomizations
is no longer justifiable, and the nominal dominance theorem no longer applies
(see the discussion in the concluding section of [13]). Further work is needed.
One implication is obvious, however: insofar as one is concerned with cyclic
systems of dichotomous random variables, unless one is guided by a predictive
theory, one is unlikely to stumble upon a contextual system of a sufficiently large
size. Of course, quantum mechanics is such a predictive theory, which is why we
know of the existence of contextual cyclic systems (although even there, most
of experimental work is confined to cyclic systems of ranks not exceeding 5).
However, our finding poses a serious problem for attempts to seek contextuality
outside quantum mechanics, where such a predictive theory may not exist.
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